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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 650 
Accident time: 23:00 Accident Date: 13/08/2010 
Where it occurred: Kassala, Al Lafa Country: Sudan 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 23/11/2010 
ID original source: BoI 2010/03 Name of source: UNMAO 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PRB M3 AT blast Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident available in February 2011 was found in a “summary of BoI 
recommendations” received in January 2011.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This 
record will be revised as more information becomes available. 
BoI summary: 
On the 13th of August 2010 a farmer in the Kassala locality of Al Lafa whilst ploughing his 
field by tractor detonated an anti tank mine in what was determined to be a previously cleared 
area. Luckily the farmer only sustained minor injuries while the tractor took the brunt of the 
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explosion. During the preliminary investigation an additional 3x AT and 1x AP mines were 
located in close proximity to the seat of the explosion within the previously cleared area. For 
additional information regarding this BOI and full report see reference F. {Annex not made 
available.] 
BoI recommendations 23/10/10 
BOI 2010/03 INVESTIGATION INTO MISSED MINE AT AL LAFA RECOMMENDATIONS 
Background 
On 13th August 2010 an Al Lafa, Kassala farmer was ploughing his field by tractor at 
approximately 2300hrs, when he detonated an antitank mine. The left rear tyre was 
destroyed, luckily he survived with surprisingly minor injuries. After some initial confusion as 
to whether the mine was or was not in a cleared area (perhaps a data reading error) and a 
preliminary investigation, it was established that the site had been previously cleared. BOI 
2010/03 was initiated to determine the facts and make recommendations to the mineaction 
community. 
The initial investigation team moved to the site without clearing any form of safe lane and 
located another two PRB M3 Anti Tank (AT) mines which had been ploughed to the surface. 
Subsequent clearance by military engineers out to a radius of 20 meters around the accident 
site located another PRB M3 AT mine and a PRB M35 Anti Personnel (AP) mine. 
A trial was conducted to determine if the MineLab F3 detector (used by the company during 
this manual clearance task) could detect PRB M35 AP mines (minimum metal) to a depth of 
13 cm. It was determined that it could. Interestingly, an Ebinger 421 Ground Compensating 
(GC) detector was also trialed, it failed to meet the 13cm minimum depth against the PRB 
M35 AP mine 
During the BOI investigation it was found that the on site documentation handed over to the 
sub-office at the completion of the task was very poor. This made it very difficult for the BOI 
team to determine the extent of the cleared area, mine lines worked on, technical survey 
completed to "fade out" the task, etc. were not evident. There was also no daily work sheets, 
daily work completed, detector testing, site map, visitors log, etc Note: the Mine Action office 
accepted this at the completion and hand-over of the task 
The paperwork on behalf of the sub-office was also poor. The lack of on site visits and quality 
assurance (QA) checks contributed to the poor paperwork of the clearance organisation. The 
BOI team was not willing to walk in the area to conduct an on site check. With no fixed Bench 
Mark, errors apparent in the completion report — several turning points were more than 100m 
apart, one at 212m apart, it was impossible to locate a metal peg in the ground at those 
distances. 
We would all admit that we have made errors with documentation in the past. All contractors, 
NGOs and the LTNMAO as the coordinating agency should be aware that this is 
unacceptable. It is all very well to pull mines out of the ground, but if the documentation is not 
there to support it, we are wasting our time. Make a commitment now to place a greater 
emphasis on accurate reporting and procedures. 
Recommendations of the BOI 
The board made the following recommendations: 
• Clearance Organisation 
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1. Greater supervision and/or training is provided to ensure that an adequate level of record-
keeping and completion documentation is maintained in accordance with Sudan National 
Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) in the future. 
2. The following documentation is added to the clearance organisation SOP 
• Visitors log 
• Detector running log 
• Stores and equipment register 
• CDS Standing orders 
• Demolition plans and safety brief 
3. Internal training should be conducted with all team leaders and supervisors in order to 
improve the standard of report writing, particularly completion reports. 
4. Missed mine drills are to be increased to a five meter box around any area where a mine is 
not found in a mine row. 
5. Internal QA should be conducted in accordance with NTSG 
6. Revert to completing the UNMAO daily report, not the old IMSMA weekly report. 
UNMAO 
1. Kassala sub-office should carry out a review of all QA practices. If training is needed, 
support should be given. 
2. Kassala sub-office should carry out a review of all contractors/NCO task documentation in 
relation to quality of recording. 
3. Kassala Operations Officer to assist the process by conducting QA checks and to take a 
more proactive approach to the events in his AOR 
4. NRMAO to issue an immediate safety notice to all contractors and sub-offices on the 
requirement to create a safe working lane to sites where accidents or detonations have taken 
place before any movement to investigate the situation. 
5. A detector trial has highlighted that the Ebinger 421 GC detector will not detect minimum 
metal mines such as the PRB M35 AP mine at the required depth. All companies must be 
warned and a review undertaken by UNMAO in relation to allowing this detector to be used 
against these mines. 
Would you please disseminate to all implementing partners. 
Signed: [Name removed], Deputy Chief of Ops UNMAO, 23/11/2010 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 833 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: driver civilian  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: None Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
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COMMENT: Minor injuries. No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as “Management Control 
Inadequacy” because the UN authority that contracted the clearance work at the Task clearly 
did not ensure that work was conducted appropriately or insist of receipt of clear records of 
the work that had been done, or precisely where it had been conducted. Several other missed 
mines were found during the investigation.  
The investigator identified the management control inadequacies in a professional and 
refreshingly objective manner. It is regrettable that the full report has not been made 
available. Despite the failings implying an inexcusably amateur management, this 
investigation provides evidence of a commitment to learn from the lessons that it highlights. 
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